By Richard S. Markovits
Volume 2 makes use of the commercial and felony concepts/theories of quantity 1 to (1) study the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers, joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for vertical integration and (2) examine similar positions of students and U.S. and E.U. antitrust officers. Its research of horizontal mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for opting for whether or not they appear particular anticompetitive cause, might reduce festival, or are rendered lawful through the efficiencies they'd generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts’ conventional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC instructions and the eu fee (EC) instructions, and a few of the non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have more and more been utilizing, (3) argues that, even though the 2010 U.S. instructions and DOJ/FTC officers speak about marketplace definition as though it concerns, these instructions truly reject market-oriented methods, and (4) experiences the suitable U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its research of conglomerate mergers (1) exhibits that they could practice a similar valid and competition-increasing features as horizontal mergers and will yield illegitimate earnings and reduce pageant via expanding contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation obstacles to funding, (2) analyzes the determinants of some of these results, and (3) assesses limit-price idea, the toe-hold-merger doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its research of vertical behavior (1) examines the valid capabilities of every form of such behavior, (2) delineates the stipulations less than which each and every manifests particular anticompetitive motive and/or lessens festival, and (3) assesses comparable U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. Its research of joint ventures (1) explains that they violate U.S. legislations simply after they show up particular anticompetitive rationale whereas they violate E.U. legislations both hence or simply because they reduce pageant, (2) discusses the that means of an “ancillary restraint” and demonstrates that no matter if a joint-venture contract will be unlawful if it imposed no restraints and no matter if any restraints imposed are ancillary should be made up our minds in simple terms via case-by-case research, (3) explains why students and officers overestimate the commercial potency of R&D joint ventures, and (4) discusses similar U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. The study’s end (1) stories how its analyses justify its leading edge conceptual platforms and (2) compares U.S. and E.U. antitrust legislation as written and as applied.
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Additional info for Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law: Volume II Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Mergers, Vertical Practices, and Joint Ventures
I should add that, in some cases, a horizontal merger will also reduce QV-investment competition in the area of product-space in which it is executed by creating a merged firm that finds it profitable to withdraw one or more of the MPs’ QV investments in circumstances in which such a choice will not lead a rival to make a QV investment (or an equally-large amount of QV investments). The merged firm will find such consolidation or rationalization profitable when the profits the use of the removed QV investment generated for that MP were lower than the amount by which the relevant QV investment reduced the profit-yields of the projects of the other MP or, more to the point, the other projects of the merged firm and the merged firm knows that the withdrawn QV investment will not be replaced by a rival QV investment (or possibly by an equally-competitive rival QV investment).
I will start by delineating and discussing the determinants of the first item in the preceding two-item list. Before doing so, however, I should admit that the need for information on these factors would be substantially reduced if it could be shown that the MPs and the merged firm’s Rs had successfully practiced contrived oligopolistic pricing prior to the relevant merger’s proposal or execution, though even then information on the determinants of the profitability of such pricing would be useful to the extent that it would enable the relevant decisionmaker to assess whether conditions in the ARDEPPS had changed between the time that the relevant actors had engaged in such pricing and the time of the merger proposal in ways that would make such pricing unprofitable at the later date absent the merger.
U. competition law). A horizontal merger that is executed in an ARDEPPS in which prices are set across-the-board and that generates no static marginal-cost efficiencies will affect the COMs that the merged firm and its Rs attempt to contrive in many ways. I will focus first on the ways in which such a merger will affect the merged firm’s practice of contrived oligopolistic pricing and then on the ways in which it will affect the merged firm’s Rs’ practice of contrived oligopolistic pricing. So far as the merged firm is concerned, such a merger will (1) decrease the OMs it attempts to contrive (relative to the OMs the MPs would have attempted to contrive) by increasing the amount of safe profits it must put at risk to do so (by increasing the merged firm’s [HNOP þ NOM À MC] figure), (2) increase the OMs it attempts to contrive by creating a larger firm that can take advantage of company-wide economies of scale in building and maintaining a reputation for contrivance, 2.
Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law: Volume II Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Mergers, Vertical Practices, and Joint Ventures by Richard S. Markovits